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In the cause of good international understanding, within the Empire and 
without it; for the sake of our export trade; in the interests of our tourist 
traffic; above all, perhaps, in the discharge of our great responsibilities to 
the other countries of the Commonwealth of British peoples, we must 
master the art of national projection.1 
 
So wrote the secretary of the Empire Marketing Board, Stephen Tallents, in his 1932 
essay, The Projection of England. This publication helped to bolster the case of those in 
Whitehall who had been seeking for some time to convince the British government of 
the necessity of funding some form of “cultural propaganda.” However, it was the 
rise of fascism and Nazism, combined with intense economic competition, which 
finally led the British government to set up an arms-length institution. Thus, when 
the British Council was founded in 1934, Foreign Office priorities determined its 
principal targets: Europe, the Middle East and South America. Despite this fact the 
official objectives of the Council clearly left the way open for it to play a role in the 
countries of the British Empire and Commonwealth, setting it the task of 
“strengthening the common cultural tradition of the British Commonwealth” (White 
7). Echoing Tallents, its mission was defined as follows: “To make the life and 
thought of the British peoples more widely known abroad; and to promote a mutual 
interchange of knowledge and ideas with other peoples.” Whilst recognizing the self-
governing status of the Dominions and the need for a collaborative approach, the use 
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of the plural “British peoples” also raised the possibility that the British Council 
might seek to “project” not only the United Kingdom but also other countries of the 
British world. It may be recalled that until 1946 all Commonwealth citizens enjoyed 
the same nationality, that of British subjects.2 
This essay examines some of the problems encountered by the Council while 
seeking to extend its activity in the British world and particularly in two of the “old 
Dominions,” Canada and Australia. The period covered is that of the earliest part of 
the Council’s history, from the late 1930s, through World War Two and the post-war 
period into the mid-1950s, when the Drogheda Report (1954) led to a major rethink of 
Council policy. It was a period which witnessed a major change both in the way the 
Council was perceived and the way it perceived itself. Commonwealth attitudes 
towards the British Council, and indeed towards Britain generally, played a crucial 
role which cannot be fully explored here: this article is based primarily on British 
archives and as such presents the British perspective. Further research in the target 
countries may in time enable us to complete this picture. 
 
The Early Years and World War Two  
The British Council was set up with a grant of a mere £6000 from the Treasury. 
Its earliest years were therefore devoted to building up an administrative structure 
and increasing its funds. The British Council began to expand in 1937 following the 
appointment of Lord Lloyd as its Chairman. A former governor of Bombay and High 
Commissioner to Egypt, Lloyd was a convinced Imperialist who was determined not 
to limit the Council to work in foreign countries. It may also be noted that the two 
deputy secretaries-general appointed at this time hailed respectively from the 
Foreign Office and from the Indian Civil Service. Although priority had to be given 
to those colonial dependencies where the threat posed by foreign propaganda 
appeared most acute, the Council was determined to start developing a programme 
with the Dominions at the earliest opportunity.3  
Initial discussions during the summer of 1939 highlighted some of the 
difficulties that were to dog the Council in its attempts to pursue this goal. The 
Dominions Office had appointed a liaison officer to work with the British Council as 
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early as 1934, recognising that the Council had a legitimate role to play in 
Commonwealth relations. Nevertheless it was reluctant to lend its support to any 
development in the Dominions. The Secretary of State for the Dominions, Sir Thomas 
Inskip, warned Lloyd that any form of centralised Empire propaganda would be 
unacceptable to the Dominion governments, although the promotion of inter-
Imperial cultural relations might prove easier. He nevertheless agreed that the 
Council could make preliminary enquiries.4 Meetings with the High Commissioners 
of Canada and Australia indicated that the Council was perceived ambivalently by 
the Dominions themselves. The Canadian High Commissioner in London, Vincent 
Massey, expressed interest but considered that an official connection with the 
Council was impossible. He offered “behind the scenes” support and suggested that 
the Council approach Major Ney of the Canadian National Council of Education and 
Overseas Education League.5 The Australian High Commissioner agreed to a limited 
role for the Council in his country, stating his preference for industrial over academic 
exchange which he considered “too dangerous”!6  
Undeterred, the Council proceeded with plans to extend its press and film 
activities to the Dominions. However, following the outbreak of war, the Council 
found itself faced with a new obstacle in the form of the Ministry of Information, 
which was equally determined to operate in the Dominions. The Council gained a 
large advantage over the new ministry when Lord Lloyd was appointed Secretary of 
State for the Colonies in 1940. The Council had in fact begun operations in some 
colonies before the war as part of its Near East program. Despite Lloyd’s death early 
in 1941, the Colonial Office continued to support an increased role for the Council in 
the colonies, and representatives were appointed in Africa and the West Indies in 
order to co-ordinate this expansion. A new Empire Division was also created later 
that year, headed by Sir Angus Gillan from the Sudan Service. Yet throughout the 
war, the Dominions Office, like the India Office, refused to sanction any expansion of 
the Council’s work, preferring simply to use certain of its services regarding books, 
films, exhibitions and scholarships (White 40).  
The Council remained nevertheless committed to building up links with the 
Commonwealth, and its Royal Charter (1940) specifically assigned to it the “purpose 
 24 
 
of benefitting the British Commonwealth of Nations.”7 Another series of meetings 
with the Dominion High Commissioners in December 1940, organised without prior 
consultation with the Dominions office, proved largely inconclusive. A year later, the 
Secretary of State for the Dominions, Lord Cranborne, wrote to the Council’s 
Chairman reminding him that no new work was to be undertaken in the Dominions 
until the end of the war was in sight, to avoid provoking criticism of the UK.8 This 
did not prevent Robertson from sending letters of introduction for Gillan, the 
recently appointed head of the Empire Division, to the High Commissioners of 
Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Canada in order that they might meet to 
discuss expansion.9 All agreed in principle that the Council had a role to play in the 
Dominions but that no action should be taken until after the war.10 
A number of factors combined effectively to bar the British Council from 
establishing itself in the Dominions before and during the Second World War: the FO 
did not consider them sufficiently important, the Treasury did not wish to fund such 
activity and the relevant government departments were suspicious of the Council 
and preferred to maintain control of all information work. Furthermore, it was 
debateable whether the methods which were applied in foreign countries, and in 
some colonies, would be either suitable for, or welcome in, the Dominions. As Gillan 
noted in a report produced in 1943: 
 
Even if an institutional system under British Council representatives 
were to be acceptable to Dominion opinion, which is highly doubtful, it 
would be impossible to cover the whole field; there would be almost 
inevitable over-lapping with High Commissioners’ Publicity Offices, 
and however carefully Council staff were selected there would be ample 
opportunities for friction.11 
 
If the Council wished to establish a Commonwealth programme it would have to 
develop a new approach. 
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Projecting the British nations 
The lack of representatives in the Dominions did not prevent the Council from 
communicating about the Empire, nor from seeking to strengthen cultural relations 
within it. However, this was far from virgin territory and much exchange already 
existed in those areas which particularly interested the Council: the press and films, 
education and the arts.12 It risked, moreover, finding itself in competition with 
organisations such as the Imperial Relations Trust, founded in 1937 with the aim of 
reinforcing ties between the UK and the Dominions. Indeed, certain members of the 
Royal Empire Society would later urge the Dominions Office to keep the Council out 
of the Dominions in order to leave the field free for voluntary societies.13 Yet leading 
voices within the Council believed strongly in its imperial mission.  
As has already been noted, it was still possible to imagine that the British 
Council could promote the culture of individual Dominions, to the extent that they 
could be considered to express the “life and thought of the British peoples.” Yet 
defining and promoting a shared British culture was fraught with difficulties. Thus 
the Palace of Arts at the British Empire Exhibition of 1924 had served to highlight 
nascent national identities as much as a common “Empire art” (August 44). 
Interestingly, the first suggestion that the British Council might take on such a 
responsibility came not from within the Council itself but from Canada House. It was 
requested that a selection of paintings from the 1938 Tate exhibition A Century of 
Canadian Art be exhibited abroad by the Council. The Council rejected the proposal, 
which nevertheless sparked debate among its staff, with one officer being moved to 
declare “Surely Canadian Art is British art.”14 It is unclear to what extent the 
Canadian request was grounded in a belief that Canadian art was a subset of a wider 
British tradition. It seems more likely that it was a pragmatic attempt to finance the 
promotion of Canadian art. Indeed, the building up of national cultural institutions 
in Canada during the 1930s had benefitted greatly from American funds through the 
Carnegie Corporation and Rockefeller Foundation, as well from smaller British 
contributions (Tippett 143-154).15 The same organisations were also active in Australia 
(Alomes 69).16 
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The idea that the Council might take on the “projection” of other “British 
nations” resurfaced from time to time. The distribution of Australian materials by the 
British Council was discussed with the Australian High Commissioner in 1939.17 On 
a smaller scale, the director of the Anglophile Society in Rio de Janeiro, who shortly 
afterwards became the Council’s representative in Brazil, succeeded in developing a 
Canadian section in his library using materials supplied by the Canadian Trade 
Commission.18 Massey also evoked the possibility of Anglo-Canadian co-operation in 
South America.19 Near the end of the war, an Australian Council officer based in 
Jerusalem tried to convince the London office to include “Australian examples of 
British achievements” in travelling exhibitions. He also argued in favour of 
developing a true partnership with Australia, thereby “making [the Council] more a 
British Council in the widest imperial sense.”20 Although there is no evidence to 
suggest that any of his suggestions were acted on, his was not a lone voice. 
Galvanised by the support of the Australian politician Richard Casey, who was 
acting as the British Minister resident in the Middle East, the Chairman of the British 
Council went so far as to announce to the House of Commons that he hoped one day 
to turn the Council into the “British Empire Council.”21 Such a position had never 
had the support of the Dominions Office, who resented the Council’s repeated efforts 
to establish contact directly with the Dominion governments.22 The question was 
ultimately settled in 1944, when a meeting of the High Commissioners with various 
departments, including the Dominions Office and the Ministry of Information, 
agreed that it was for each autonomous Dominion to carry out its own “projection” 
in the UK and abroad.23 
 
Dominion Councils 
The British Council was widely seen as a propaganda organisation both abroad 
and at home and this proved a major obstacle in persuading the Dominions to work 
with it.24 The Council was aware of this, and the idea was even mooted of setting up 
an alternative body to work with the Dominions.25 If the Council was to overcome 
Dominion suspicions it had to emphasise the reciprocal nature of its work. Yet the 
Council not only suffered from lack of representation in the Dominions, it also 
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struggled to find similar bodies with which it could work in setting up any kind of 
two-way cultural traffic. In the case of Canada, Massey repeatedly suggested that the 
Council should work through the National Council of Education, but this was 
unsatisfactory from the Council’s point of view as discussions with its head, Major 
Ney, had proved their positions to be divergent and Ney “quite hopeless to deal 
with.”26  
From his appointment in 1941, Angus Gillan sought to develop an alternative 
strategy. This was to encourage the creation of Dominion Councils similar to the 
British Council in the hope that these “collateral councils” could act as both the 
consultants and agents of the British Council. The creation of a network of councils 
would enable it to develop projects in the Dominions without having to establish its 
own offices there. Moreover, the question of the British Council representing the 
Dominions would cease to arise. The Dominion Councils could collaborate with the 
Council whilst interacting with one another. This project held obvious attractions for 
the British Council: it would be cheaper than sending staff abroad and would bypass 
the UK High Commissioners who could potentially veto such representation 
anyway. It was also intended as a way of extending the Council’s influence in the 
Empire-Commonwealth without antagonising the Dominions. The Council clearly 
imagined a leading role for itself: it was envisaged that in such a system the “Empire 
side” of the British Council would “become recognised as a real Empire cultural 
clearing house.”27 
War conditions proved oddly favourable to the pursuit of this policy. Firstly, 
the Council hoped that an attempt at rapprochement would be more favourably 
received in time of war. A report from January 1940 argued that, “it is easier for us to 
dwell upon the theme of Imperial unity when the Dominions themselves have 
asserted that unity in the most striking manner possible than it is to do so when the 
initiative has to come entirely from our side.” The same report went on to identify a 
“supreme opportunity” afforded by the war, namely the presence in the UK of 
Dominion troops.28 Massey advised the Council to use this opportunity to make itself 
known to the Canadians.29 The Home Division was built up for this purpose and by 
1942 was arranging and paying for university courses, organising visits, teaching 
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English to French Canadians and showing news reels in camps. This programme was 
devised with the Council’s long-term aims in mind; as the Executive Committee was 
informed, the Council was not only interpreting Great Britain to the Canadians, it 
was also “interesting them generally in the work of the Council so that they might be 
encouraged to do something similar for themselves.”30  
Early in 1942, an anonymous gift of £10,000 for strengthening cultural links 
between the UK and Canada provided the Council with an opportunity to take more 
active steps in stimulating the formation of a Canadian body similar to the British 
Council.31 Michael Huxley, formerly the British press attaché at the Washington 
Embassy, was sent on an exploratory tour of Canada, where he was greeted with “a 
mixture of sympathy and suspicion.”32 His mission was considered particularly 
important as its outcome would affect Council policy in all the Dominions. Indeed it 
was foreseen that a Canadian body might act as a prototype for other Dominion 
councils.33  
Huxley recommended the establishment of what became the Canadian 
Committee, whose main task would be to “interpret” Canada to the Commonwealth 
forces based there. At the request of the Canadian Committee, F. A. Gray of the 
Council’s Empire Division was seconded to act as their Assistant Secretary, but the 
two organisations were not formally linked.34 The head of the Empire Division, 
Angus Gillan, was sufficiently pleased with the initial success of this project to claim 
in 1943: “the inauguration in Canada of a collateral body carrying out work similar to 
that of the British Council and capable of acting in co-operation with the latter in 
matters of common interest has been achieved.”35  
The Canadian Committee did not however continue to expand in the way that 
the Council had hoped. By 1944 Gillan was forced to reassess the results obtained: 
  
So far they are so busy putting their own house in order that the last 
thing they are likely to think of is to do anything for us. We are on very 
good terms with them as long as we do not go further than this, but 
there have been obvious signs of suspicion of any form of Council 
intervention or patronage.36 
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The gulf widened once the Committee became the Canada Foundation in May 1945. 
Unlike other cultural organisations formed in Canada during the war, such as the 
Arts Liaison Committee, the Foundation’s position was that private individuals 
rather than the government should be responsible for developing cultural activities. 
The Canada Foundation was dominated by Walter Herbert who, although he 
favoured promoting Canadian culture abroad, later advised the Canadian 
Department of Trade and Commerce against the formation of a Canada Council along 
the lines of the British Council (Tippett 172-178). 
 
Post-war policy 
Given the failure, at least from the Council’s point of view, of the Canadian 
Committee experiment, Gillan was forced to reopen the debate on how best to work 
in and with the Dominions: should they aim at official representation or simply 
employ “Dominion men” to open offices which would distribute Council material? 
By January 1945, Gillan had come to the conclusion that although the creation of 
Dominion Councils remained the long-term objective, the Council had to have 
“representation on the spot.”37 The British Council began to make tentative steps 
towards establishing its presence in Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South 
Africa. Gillan was wary of arousing the suspicions of the Dominion governments 
and the Council therefore advanced cautiously, seeking official invitations.38 
Although not necessarily hostile to the British Council, they were not sufficiently 
enthusiastic to issue formal invitations. It was difficult for the Council to overcome 
official inertia; as a sympathetic contact at Australia House commented to a New 
Zealander employed by the Council: “You know the difficulty from your own 
experience in getting Governments, particularly Dominion Governments, to move in 
these matters.”39  
The Dominions Office’s position was not entirely hostile. At a meeting to 
discuss future publicity work held in October 1944, the possibility of using the 
Council as an agent was discussed.40 Yet by the end of the war the Dominions Office 
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was once again resisting the Council’s attempts to establish itself in the Dominions, 
arguing that, 
 
The Council is exclusively concerned with presenting this country on the 
cultural side and the culture of the Dominions—except perhaps in 
French Canada and amongst Afrikaans-speaking South Africans—is 
fundamentally the same as our own. The people of the Dominions do 
not need the Council to teach them English, nor do they need to have 
explained to them our basic institutions, or (at the other extreme), the 
way in which the English take their meals.41  
 
The Dominions Office continued to perceive the Council as being primarily 
concerned with “national projection” yet the experience of the war had led to a shift 
in the way in which the Council interpreted its mission. The Council’s work with 
refugees and its involvement in the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education (the 
forerunner of UNESCO) had led to a new approach to cultural relations, which 
placed less emphasis on spreading the “British way of life” and more on reciprocity 
and mutual comprehension (Haigh 41-52).42 The Council’s commitment to building 
equal and reciprocal cultural relations with the Dominions would nevertheless 
continue to be regarded with a large degree of distrust as the organisation was still 
seen through the lens of its origins. 
South Africa was assigned the lowest priority among Commonwealth 
countries. The political situation and the introduction of apartheid meant that the 
Council more or less abandoned the idea of starting work there until the late 1950s. 
In the case of Australia, the Council managed to circumvent the Dominions Office 
opposition by re-establishing direct contact with the Australian High Commissioner. 
Although Stanley Bruce was far from an enthusiastic advocate of the Council he did 
believe that it would be “quite fatal” for the Council to work through the Information 
Services. More importantly, he showed an interest in collaborating with the Council 
in presenting the “British point of view” in the Pacific.43 This served as a pretext for 
Gillan to organize a visit to Australia with the reluctant blessing of the Dominions 
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Office.44 Such a trip was an opportunity to persuade the Australians of the potential 
benefits of allowing the Council to begin operations there. Gillan was also confident 
that New Zealand would follow Australia’s lead.45 His tour of these countries in 1945 
resulted in both governments inviting the Council to establish offices and its first 
representatives arrived in 1947.  
It was hoped that the official Council Representatives in Australia and New 
Zealand would be better placed to encourage these countries to set up their own 
councils. Public speeches, the press and personal contacts were all used to this end. 
The Australian Observer endorsed Charles Wilmot’s suggestion that Australia should 
have its own Council, arguing that this would gain the respect of others and increase 
the self-respect of Australians.46 In New Zealand the cause was taken up by the 
president of the New Zealand Drama Council.47 Yet in neither country was there 
sufficient interest or political will for such proposals to become serious projects. 
Australia’s Department of External Affairs was created a year after the British 
Council and Stephen Alomes argues that in the sphere of international cultural 
relations Australia remained subject to a “colonial cultural lag” (Alomes 70). Yet the 
British Council’s failure to generate new councils also indicates the limits of its 
influence as neither Australia nor New Zealand were quick to follow the British 
example set before. It must also be remembered that the British Council could not 
even be sure of full support within the United Kingdom itself and that its long-term 
future was not secured until the 1950s. 
It proved much harder for the British Council to gain access to Canada due to 
opposition from the Treasury and the UK High Commissioner in Canada, Sir 
Alexander Clutterbuck. Clutterbuck claimed that there was still “a certain amount of 
prejudice against the British Council and its work, largely on the grounds that it was 
designed for projecting British culture to foreign and Colonial peoples.”48 The 
recently appointed head of the new Commonwealth Division, Sir Shuldham Redfern, 
disagreed, believing that Canadian suspicions were “illusory.” In his opinion, the 
principal obstacle remained the fact that the High Commissioner was “obviously 
afraid of the Council treading on the toes of the Information Office.”49 Redfern later 
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reported to Gillan that the director of the Information Office opposed the Council 
functioning in Canada at all.50 
Redfern adopted a conciliatory approach towards the High Commissioner 
whilst working hard to obtain support from the Canadian Government. The attitude 
of the Canadian Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, was described as “encouraging” 
and Canada House even went so far as to suggest a potential candidate for the post 
of Council representative but the government would not extend a formal invitation.51 
It was, however, the deepening financial crisis which put paid to the idea of 
establishing a Council representative in Ottawa.52 Canada, with Newfoundland, was 
unique among Empire-Commonwealth countries in being outside the sterling area. 
As the UK’s dollar reserves dwindled, the Treasury was particularly reluctant to 
sanction any activity there. Clutterbuck was able to veto a proposed visit by Redfern 
in 1947 by arguing that such a visit “might give rise to misunderstanding on the part 
of the public here and result in embarrassment” due to the dollar crisis.53 Undeterred, 
Redfern sought to appeal directly to the Canadians, attempting first to win over the 
Canadian High Commissioner.54 As former Secretary to the Governor General of 
Canada, Redfern had a broad network of contacts which he mobilised in the hope of 
gaining positive coverage of the Council in the Canadian press. In a letter to the 
editor of the Ottawa Citizen, Redfern worked to dispel the notion that the Council’s 
object was to “spread propaganda of the Cecil Rhodes – Kipling variety; in other 
words a sort of veiled imperialism.” He also requested that Bowman show the letter 
to the press magnate Harry Southam (described as “my old friend”) and to any of 
Bowman’s colleagues.55  
Redfern was finally able to tour Canada a year later with the blessing of the 
Canadian government.56 He reassured Clutterbuck that the idea of establishing a 
Council office was out of the question “in the immediate future” and even dared 
hope that British Council activities in Canada could earn dollars.57 Subsequently, as 
the export drive took off, the Council also found allies in the Dollar Export Agency 
and the Board of Trade who were primarily interested in the Council’s capacity to 
influence North Americans in such a way as to stimulate exports of British goods and 
capital equipment.58 Yet the Council was ill-equipped to produce the hard evidence 
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needed for it to obtain dollars and its officers at times showed a certain disdain for 
developing economic and trade arguments.59  
Following his trip, Redfern recommended working with the High 
Commissioner’s Information Office and developing direct contacts between the UK 
and Canada rather than sending a representative. He suggested a budget of £3, 000 
would suffice. The Council hierarchy was unconvinced and given the continued lack 
of funding, no action was taken although some projects were financed on an ad hoc 
basis.60 By the end of the 1940s, budget cuts were actually forcing the Council to 
restrict its activities. These cuts intensified following the outbreak of the Korean War 
in 1950 and the ensuing rearmament programme. As the Council was forced to shut 
down offices and cultural centres across the world, the chances of setting up a new 
programme were slim.61  
This was particularly regrettable as the publication in 1951 of the report of the 
Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences (the 
Massey Report) made this a propitious moment for the Council to set up offices in 
Canada. The Commission was headed by Vincent Massey, a longstanding supporter 
of the British Council and a keen advocate of Canada developing its own 
international cultural relations body. It was not hard to find a British bias in the 
report, which, in the words of Paul Rutherford, “planned a culture as British as 
possible” (Rutherford 198). In particular, the Arts Council and the British Council 
were presented as models for a future Canada Council. Chapter seventeen of the 
report, whose title “The Projection of Canada Abroad” itself betrays the British 
influence, devoted a large section to British policy and the authors regretted that 
“alone among the Commonwealth countries” Canada had no permanent 
representative of the British Council in residence.62  
The prospect of a collateral council with whom the British Council could work 
in partnership seemed at last on the point of becoming a reality, in the shape of the 
Canada Council. The British Council clearly saw itself in the role of its special 
advisor, shaping the organisation from the moment of its conception. There was even 
talk of offering to second a British Council officer to assist the Canadian authorities. 
This was rejected on the grounds that the Canada Council would be part of the 
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Canadian apparatus for external affairs and it would therefore be improper for a UK 
officer to be too closely associated with it. It seemed preferable to offer assistance to 
Canada through a resident British Council representative and through receiving a 
Canadian officer in London.63  
The Massey Report also played a key role in changing the attitude of the UK 
High Commissioner and the Commonwealth Relations Office. Even the director of 
the Information Office in Ottawa was by now recommending that the Council should 
expand its activities in Canada.64 By the early 1950s there was therefore a consensus 
that the Council should have a representative in Ottawa and, according to British 
sources at least, the Canadian government was also more receptive to the idea.65 The 
Treasury remained the final obstacle. Clutterbuck’s successor, Sir Archibald Nye, 
expressed his frustration in 1953: 
 
I do not accept the view that we should wait until a Canada Council is 
set up. Nor do I accept the financial argument. Our task is to present the 
British way of life in as many fields as possible. Canada by now is the 
leading ‘middle’ power and to us is of vital importance. We should no 
longer say that money does not permit of the British Council functioning 
here, since to do so is to ignore our own interests and to infer that other 
Commonwealth and foreign countries in which we continue to maintain 
such representatives are more important to us than Canada.66 
 
Financial issues were in many ways the crux of the matter: although supposedly a 
non-political organisation, the British Council could only obtain funding from the 
government for work in countries which were considered sufficiently important. The 
British Council’s attempts to develop activities in Commonwealth countries had been 
dogged by the fact that the Dominions Office had happily allowed the Foreign Office 
to place these countries in its lowest priority category after the war (Eastment 264). 
The Council’s expansion was at times somewhat haphazard: on the eve of Gillan’s 
departure to Australia in 1945, doubts were raised about the wisdom of proceeding 
in Australia and New Zealand until Treasury approval had been obtained for 
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Canada, described as “a far more important member of the Commonwealth.”67 A few 
years later, Redfern warned against expanding activity in Canada at the risk of 
prejudicing work in India and Pakistan, which he considered should take 
precedence.68 
Despite the commitment of successive post-war British governments to using 
the Commonwealth to maintain Britain’s international status, the British government 
was not prepared to finance international cultural relations as a way of reinforcing 
the ties which held this association of independent nations together. Moreover, a 
clear distinction was made between those former colonies which joined the 
Commonwealth after the war and the older Dominions. Although Council 
operations in India and Pakistan also suffered from a lack of funding, they 
nevertheless received higher priority than Canada and Australia. The British Council 
was more easily perceived as a means to maintain British influence during the period 
of decolonisation than as an instrument of Commonwealth unity.  
The report of the Drogheda Committee on the Overseas Information Services 
(1953/1954) served to legitimate this position. It concluded that the Council should 
place the emphasis on educational rather than cultural work and shift its focus from 
the developed to the developing world. The report therefore recommended 
reinforcing the Council’s work in the Indian sub-continent and the colonies and 
replacing Council centres with single cultural attachés in Australia and New 
Zealand. These were indeed closed down in 1954, though on the initiative of the 
Secretary of State for the Commonwealth (Donaldson 191-192). The underlying 
assumption was that not only could these countries afford to pay for any cultural 
services they wished to receive, but that a formal system of exchange was 
unnecessary with countries that shared a common heritage and language.  
Faced with such opposition, the Council struggled to set out a cogent argument 
in favour of its Commonwealth programme. What exactly was it supposed to 
“project” in the Commonwealth? The idea of developing an imperial mission clearly 
exerted a certain influence over leading members of the Council but there was no 
concerted effort to redefine it this way. World War Two may have reinforced the 
feeling of belonging to a British family of nations yet it also reaffirmed the separate 
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identity of each Commonwealth nation (Buckner, 199-201). By the end of the war, 
Empire propaganda had become unpalatable in the Commonwealth. 
Yet the Council also doubted whether it could apply the model it had 
developed for foreign countries. Its English language teaching programmes were 
inappropriate, or were too politically sensitive, in multilingual countries like Canada 
and South Africa. Portraying the British way of life was also problematic: a 
significant proportion of the populations of the Commonwealth still considered 
themselves more British than the British, and certainly in no need of being taught 
their own culture by an organisation based in London. The Council was well aware 
of the danger that its offer to bring British culture to the countries of the 
Commonwealth could easily appear condescending, implying that they were 
uncultured. 69 And some Council members did indeed see countries like Australia as 
“culturally backward.”70  
British Council documents from throughout this period recorded the 
Dominions’ desire to recognize and nurture their separate cultural identities.71 The 
Council believed it could play an accompanying role in this process, ensuring that 
the cultures of the British world remained anchored in a British heritage. By 
encouraging the development of cultural institutions along British lines, it could also 
hope to set a pattern which would influence future cultural policy. It imagined the 
emergence of a common system which would facilitate cultural exchange among the 
associated countries. Furthermore, for many of the different players involved, 
fostering the British connection was also a way of countering the growing cultural 
influence of the United States. This argument was consistently used by the Council to 
support its request for funding for action in the Dominions and by the mid-fifties had 
become central to the Commonwealth Relations Office’s position too.72 The same 
argument was also expressed by those from the Dominions themselves. The point 
was repeatedly made by Australians during and after the war and it featured heavily 
in the Massey Report of 1951.73 
As the decline of the UK’s military and economic power became increasingly 
obvious, cultural or “soft” power could appear as an alternative way to maintain 
 37 
 
international prestige. The British Council’s first representative to Australia summed 
it up thus:  
 
It is widely realised by thinking people here that the contribution of 
Britain to 20th century civilisation will perforce be mainly in the realms 
of intelligence and culture, rather than those of economic and military 
power. In the minds of Australians, Britain is beginning to stand for 
quality of achievement rather than magnitude.74  
 
Although United States popular culture was clearly dominant, the United Kingdom 
hoped to hold its own in the field of high culture. Paradoxically, Britain’s weakness 
may have made it easier for the Council to gain access to the Dominions, as they 
moved from a position of cultural dependence to cultural partnership (Finlay 168).  
 
The story of the British Council’s attempts to work with the Dominions over 
this period seems largely to have been one of false starts. What, if any, impact was 
the Council able to make in the countries studied? Certainly Britain managed to 
retain a certain cultural influence in the countries of the British world throughout the 
1940s and into the early 1950s. The Council-sponsored tours of Australia by the Boyd 
Neel Orchestra and the Old Vic in 1947 and 1948 were both resounding successes, 
and led indirectly to the Council arranging for Tyrone Guthrie to visit Australia to 
advise the government on the establishment of a National Theatre (White 83). Canada 
consistently imported British personalities such as John Grierson and Tyrone Guthrie 
to run its cultural organisations and in light of this fact we can wonder whether 
Redfern’s policy of fostering direct contacts between British “experts” and their 
Canadian counterparts was not the best course to follow. Redfern took pains to 
highlight all the different projects he had initiated in Canada, even going so far as to 
take credit for the Massey Commission which, he claimed, was “set up mainly as a 
result of my advice to the Secretary of State for External Affairs after my visit to 
Canada on behalf of the British Council in 1948.”75 Although the Council never 
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succeeded in establishing the sister councils it hoped for, the contacts it maintained 
with influential people such as Massey may well have favoured later developments. 
However, this British influence began to die away during the 1950s. By the time a 
Council representative finally arrived in Canada in 1959, the “centre of the highbrow 
world” had arguably shifted from London to New York, though the impact of this 
shift was not felt as quickly in Australia and New Zealand (Rutherford 203; Smith 
208).76 This was undeniably as much to do with the dynamism of American as 
opposed to British culture in this period as with the failings of the British 
government’s international cultural policy. Nevertheless there is no doubt that 
Canada did indeed represent a missed opportunity for the Council. Although the 
Council initially met with great success in Australia and New Zealand, the closure of 
its centres so soon after their inauguration must have been damaging to intra-
Commonwealth cultural relations and to the UK’s prestige. 
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